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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we provide a critical analysis of the theory of the expansionary austerity (EAT). Our attention is on 
the theoretical weaknesses of the EAT, say the extreme circumstances and fragile assumptions under which 
expansionary consolidations might actually take place. We present a simple theoretical model that takes 
inspiration from both the post-Keynesian and evolutionary/institutionalist traditions. We first show that well-
designed austerity measures hardly trigger off short-run economic expansions in the context of expected long-
lasting consolidation plans (i.e. when adjustment plans deal with remarkably high debt-to-GDP ratios); when 
the so-called ‘financial channel’ is not operative (i.e. in the context of monetarily sovereign economies); when 
the degree of export responsiveness to internal devaluation is low. Even in the context of non-monetarily 
sovereign countries (see Eurozone countries), austerity’s effectiveness crucially depends on its highly disputable 
capacity to immediately stabilize fiscal variables. We then analyse some possible long-run economic dynamics. 
We emphasize the high degree of instability that characterizes austerity-based adjustments plans. Path-
dependency and cumulativeness make the short-run impulse effects of fiscal consolidation of paramount 
importance to (hopefully) obtain any appreciable medium-to-long-run benefit. Should these effects be 
contractionary on the onset, the short-run costs of austerity measures can breed an endless spiral of recession 
and ballooning debt in the long run. If so, in the case of non-monetarily sovereign countries debt forgiveness 
may emerge as the ultimate solution to restore economic soundness. Alternatively, institutional innovations like 
those adopted since mid-2012 by the ECB are required to stabilize the economy, although not to prompt 
sustained recovery. 
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1. The theory of expansionary austerity and its critiques: An overview 
 
The theory of expansionary austerity is part of a long-standing debate in economic 
literature on the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Nonetheless, the theory of the ‘expansionary 
fiscal austerity’ as we currently know it emerged at the beginning of the 90s when some 
economists started to argue that discretionary expansionary fiscal policies may have non-
Keynesian effects (see Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990 and 1996; Alesina and Perotti, 1995; 
more recently, see Alesina and Ardagna, 2010 and 2012). According to them, at least under 
certain circumstances 1 , expansionary fiscal policies may be ineffective to stimulate 
economic activity, and may actually put at risk the solidity of the financial system by giving 
rise to unsustainable fiscal stances. Symmetrically, well-conceived fiscal restrictions may 
stimulate private consumption and investment, as well as improve export dynamics. 
Eventually, economic activity may expand rather than contract, and give rise to a case of 
expansionary fiscal consolidation.  
The vast majority of the existing critiques to the EAT has addressed the shortcomings of 
the econometric techniques adopted by EAT supporters in order to empirically validate 
their theoretical propositions. A first strand of criticisms points to the concept of (changes 
in the) cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) as erroneous and misleading measure 
of discretionary fiscal policy shocks (see Guajardo et al., 2011; Baker and Rosnick, 2014). A 
second critique raises the issue of an inverse causality between economic dynamics and 
fiscal policy, since that different phases of the business cycle may have relevant 
implications as to the restrictive/expansionary fiscal stances governmental authorities may 
eventually adopt (Baker and Rosnick, 2014). Finally, a growing body of empirical analyses 
provides evidence of a cycle-contingent fiscal multiplier, which is largely positive during 
recessions (Guajardo et al., 2011; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012; Qazizada and 
Stockhammer, 2015). It is easy to see how this evidence is radically at odds with the 
concept of a negative fiscal multiplier implicitly advocated by the expansionary austerity 
doctrine. 
The aim of this paper is not to add another piece to the abundant literature on the 
econometric reliability of the EAT. Rather, we want to move the focus of the analysis to the 
theory, and enquire the theoretical solidity of the expansionary austerity viewpoint. So far, 
a few works have tried to analytically underline the theoretical weaknesses of the EAT 
from a heterodox perspective. In our view, these contributions are not completely 
satisfactory. On the one hand, they often rely on quite ad-hoc assumptions. On the other 
hand, they model austerity packages too roughly, without considering the specific policy 
measures composing them. In this paper, we try to fix these shortcomings by presenting a 
simple theoretical model. 
The final goal of our model is twofold. First, we critically investigate the influential 
assertion by Alberto Alesina according to which “many even sharp reductions of budget 
deficits have been accompanied and immediately followed by sustained growth rather than 
recessions even in the very short run [cursive is of the authors] (Alesina, 2010, p.3)”. In 
this sense, we stress that the theoretical fundamentals and economic mechanisms of the 
                                                        
1 See Sutherland (1997) for the case of possible non-Keynesian effects of expansionary fiscal measures when 
undertaken in a context of high public debt. Perotti (2012) also stresses that fiscal contractions may be 
expansionary in presence of high interest rates, in particular when they contribute to reduce risk premia on 
financial assets, on government bonds first of all, and prompt a considerable reduction in nominal interest 
rates.  
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expansionary austerity hypothesis are extremely fragile, and state- and institutional-
contingent, to say the least. Second, we analyze the long-run dynamics possibly set in 
motions by austerity measures. Our aim is to criticize the idea that fiscal consolidations 
might imply short-term costs, but lead to far larger medium-to-long-run benefits in the 
form of safer and sounder public finances, stable or decreasing public debt-to-GDP ratios, 
revived economic activity as stimulated by booming investments in the private sector2. We 
rather stress that austerity-induced short-run costs and long-run benefits may be 
inconsistent with each other. Indeed, even mild recessionary responses to adjustment 
programs may give rise to instable evolutions in the public debt-to-GDP ratio, so that the 
short-run costs of austerity measures may eventually breed even larger long-run damages 
(rather than benefits). 
Our model takes inspiration from the post-Keynesian and evolutionary/institutionalist 
tradition. From the post-Keynesian tradition, we take the demand-driven logic that 
permeates the functioning of our model. We also pay attention to the importance that 
mounting Keynesian-type radical uncertainty after the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis 
in the Eurozone may have played and may still play in defining economic actors’ 
expectations and behaviors. According to the evolutionary approach to systems’ dynamics 
(Radzicki and Sterman, 1994), we describe an economy in which cumulative mechanisms 
may give rise to path dependence and multiple equilibria. We also put emphasis on the 
crucial role country-specific institutions play in shaping diverging economic trajectories. 
We note that austerity may lead to different outcomes depending on the specific ‘monetary 
environment’ in which it is implemented. Whilst the short-run expansionary outcomes of 
austerity measures hardly emerge in monetary sovereign (say the USA, the UK, Canada or 
Japan) and non-monetary sovereign countries (i.e. nowadays Eurozone member states) 
alike, the way central banks intervene to stop financial distress turns out to be a decisive 
factor in order to tame or feed long-run macroeconomic instability. In the case of non-
monetarily sovereign countries, in the absence of any deep institutional discontinuity, debt 
forgiveness may eventually emerge as the ultimate solution to restore economic soundness. 
This fact notwithstanding, the changes in monetary institutions’ commitments taking place 
in the Eurozone since mid-2012 also show that economic variables and institutional factors 
may eventually co-evolve in response to existing economic problems. Such a joint 
endogenous evolution may give rise to structural breaks through which new and much 
more stable dynamics set in, even though not a solid recovery yet.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the short-run part of our model. 
We model the well-designed consolidation packages advocated by the supporters of the 
EAT, and analyze their impact on current economic activity and on the deficit-to-GDP 
ratio. Section 3 moves to the long run and shows how fiscal variables (and eventually 
economic institutions) may (co-)evolve through time as a consequence of (and perhaps in 
reaction to) the short-run effects assessed before. Section 4 concludes. 
      
 
 
                                                        
2 According to Warmedinger et al. (2015), “the medium-to-longer-term benefits of well-designed fiscal 
consolidation are typically accompanied by short-term costs in the form of output losses, [but] since sound 
government finances are a prerequisite for price and macroeconomic stability and, consequently, for 
strengthening the conditions for sustainable growth, the long-term benefits of achieving such goals outweigh 
the short-term costs (Warmedinger et al., 2015, p.1)”. 
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2. Short-run expansionary/contractionary effects of fiscal adjustments in a 
simple open economy 
 
To the best of our knowledge, only a few non-mainstream studies have aimed at 
analytically showing the intrinsic theoretical fragility of the expansionary austerity 
doctrine.  
Robert Boyer (2012) surveys the specific conjunctures under which, in the past, 
austerity measures might have been expansionary in a few small open economies. He 
stresses that there is “no general theoretical reason to guarantee the success of any 
austerity policy (Boyer, 2012, p.297)”. Nevertheless, Boyer does not provide any formal 
treatment of his point.  
Palley (2010) elaborates a simple post-Keynesian demand-driven closed-economy 
model showing the short-run effects of fiscal rules imposing limits to the debt-to-GDP 
ratio. Dosi et al. (2015) present an evolutionary model featuring complex micro-macro 
interactions. They extend the scope of Palley’s analysis by considering the long-run 
consequences austerity-imposed ceilings to government deficits may display on trend 
growth and macroeconomic volatility by affecting R&D efforts and technology progress. 
Yet, both models have some common drawbacks. They are somehow unsuitable to confute 
the EAT on its own ground since that their theoretical frameworks engineer in-built 
contractionary outcomes of austerity measures3. 
Foresti and Marani (2014) propose a simple short-run model in which austerity may 
have expansionary outcomes depending on the accommodative stance monetary policy 
may take in presence of fiscal retrenchments. In doing this, however, they still superficially 
define austerity as a reduction in public deficit, this way taking the squeezing effects of 
fiscal consolidation on public deficit as granted.  
In this paper, we propose an analytical treatment of the argumentative approach 
developed by Boyer (2012). With respect to Palley (2010) and Dosi et al. (2015), our model 
allows for a wider variety of results, so that EAT may be criticized more effectively by 
arguing about the implausibility of its own assumptions and mechanisms. With respect to 
Foresti and Marani (2014), our model is more detailed in the analysis of the specific policy 
measures composing well-designed austerity packages, but at the same time it is more 
general in the type of results it may give rise (i.e. shrinking or widening fiscal deficits). 
Let assume an open economy. Further, let assume that the economy does not work at 
full potential in order to allow for (fiscal) policy-driven expansions of aggregate demand 
and, hence, current economic activity. Indeed, the expansionary austerity literature argues 
that well-designed fiscal adjustments can boost economic activity through both supply and 
demand channels4. This fact notwithstanding, most of its emphasis is on demand-side 
channels, perhaps in order to stress its non-Keynesian perspective on the effects of fiscal 
                                                        
3 Palley (2010) and Dosi et al. (2015) consider simple closed economy in which, by default, the ‘external 
channel’ through which austerity is supposed to deliver some expansionary results is inoperative. Also, both 
model identify austerity with deficit-cutting rules. They do not enter into the details of what is considered a 
well-designed consolidation plan. 
4 Alesina and Ardagna (2010) argue that lower public sector employment, lower public sector wages, and (or) 
lower degrees of labor market protection (say cut in unemployment benefits), tend to reduce trade unions’ 
bargaining power and to increase individual labor supply. In the context of supply driven mainstream 
models, this may eventually stimulate growth by leading to an expanding aggregate supply. 
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policies5. In line with this logic, and with the attempt to show its shortcomings, here we 
focus on the operativeness of the demand-side levers only. 
Our economy is composed by six sectors: working households, rentiers, (non-financial) 
firms, the government, commercial banks, and, ultimately, the ‘Rest of the World’ (RoW 
henceforth). 
Working households get wages (w) from non-financial firms. They consume domestic 
goods (C), import foreign-made products, and pay taxes according to the tax rate t. They 
also receive public transfers (TrG) and unemployment benefits (?̅?𝑈) from the government. 
Working households’ savings take the form of new deposits to commercial banks.  
Rentiers get dividends from commercial banks6, as well as interest payments on their 
holdings of foreign financial assets. For the sake of simplicity, we assume rentiers not to 
consume. Rentiers use their savings in order to accumulate new foreign financial assets 
according to a sort of Panama papers-type investment fashion.  
Non-financial firms pay wages to workers and make interest payments (iHL) on the 
stock of loans from commercial banks. They get revenues through workers’ consumption 
expenditures, government purchases, exports to the RoW (XE), and domestic gross capital 
formation (I). Realized profits (Π) are fully retained7 in order to finance desired capital 
accumulation together with new loans (dL) from commercial banks.  
Commercial banks provide loans (L) to domestic firms and buy domestic government’ 
bonds. Accordingly, they get interest payments (iHL) from domestic firms and (iDDHb) from 
the government. Commercial banks receive deposits from households. We assume interest 
rates on households’ deposits to be equal to zero. Commercial banks’ profits are fully 
redistributed to rentiers. New equity issuances are not considered in the present paper. 
The government undertakes current consumption expenditures (G), and makes 
transfers to working households. It also levies taxes on working households’ income. In the 
expansionary austerity literature, taxes on households’ income represent a crucial 
component of ‘well-designed’ austerity packages. Alesina and Perotti (1997) argue that 
successful fiscal consolidations (‘type-1 adjustments’ in the jargon of the authors) “rely 
primarily on expenditure cuts, in particular cuts in transfers, social security, government 
wages, and employment [whilst] tax increases are a small fraction of the total adjustment, 
and, in particular, taxes on households are not raised at all or are even reduced (Alesina 
and Perotti, 1997, p.211)”. On the contrary, contractionary “type-2 adjustments rely mostly 
on broad-based tax increases, and often the largest increases are in taxes on households 
and social security contributions (Alesina and Perotti, 1997, p.211)”8. Consistently with this 
                                                        
5 Alesina et al. (2015) clearly point out that a decisive aspect of successful austerity packages lies in their 
capacity to stimulate private sector’s investments by fostering private sector’s confidence in the solidity of the 
domestic macroeconomic environment. Such a peculiar component of (successful) expenditure-based fiscal 
consolidations versus (unsuccessful) tax-based adjustments “cannot be explained by (accompanying) supply 
side reforms (Alesina et al., 2015, p.37)”; it implicitly relies upon the existence of a ‘negative’ fiscal multiplier 
of aggregate demand. 
6 We assume rentiers to be the ultimate owners of commercial banks by holding commercial banks’ equities. 
7 In the age of financialization of non-financial firms and increased shareholder value orientation, this 
represents a strong assumption. Yet, it is fully consistent with the focus of this paper on the macroeconomic 
effects of austerity measures rather than on the intrinsic evolution of modern capitalist economies. This 
assumption does not reduce in any way the degree of generality of our analysis, whilst it makes it more 
tractable from a mathematical point of view.    
8 Alesina and Perotti (1997) also stress that spending cuts matched with (expected) reductions in households 
taxes may lead to expansionary outcomes by reducing workers’ wage claims, by inducing wage moderation, 
and hence by increasing the external competitiveness of homemade goods.   
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logic, here we will critically enquire whether, and under which conditions, spending cuts 
could be successfully matched with (expected) reductions in households’ taxes in order to 
make fiscal consolidations expansionary. For the sake of simplicity, we do not include in 
our model taxes on rentiers’ income or firms’ profits (or indirect taxes).  
The difference between government’s revenues and total expenditures gives public 
surplus (or deficit). Public deficit is financed by issuing new government bonds (B=dD). 
Both commercial banks and the RoW buy domestic government bonds.  
As to international trade flows, the RoW sells us imported goods in the amount (XM) 
and buys exports (XE). As to financial transactions, financial outflows are given by 
domestic rentiers’ accumulation of new assets abroad. Financial inflows take the form of 
new home government bonds net purchases by the RoW, i.e. (𝐵𝑅𝑜𝑊 = 𝑑𝐷𝑅𝑜𝑊
𝐻 ). In this 
regard, the decision of foreign investors to buy home government bonds (rather than 
‘keeping their money abroad’) relies upon the well-known uncovered interest rate parity 
(UIP). Exchange rate fluctuations, and the ensuing exchange rate risk, constitute a relevant 
factor in defining the UIP. For the sake of simplicity, here we depart from this 
complication and do not explicitly take into account exchange rate dynamics in 
determining, through the UIP, the interest rate on home government bonds (see below). In 
the specific case of Eurozone countries, this assumption is justified by the fact that intra-
Eurozone financial flows are not affected by any consideration (or concern) about 
exchange rate dynamics. 
 
2.1 The model 
Let assume the economy to produce according to a fixed-coefficient production technique. 
Equation (1) defines the current level of economic activity (Y) as a function of the level of 
capacity utilization (y= Y/Y*)9, the output-capital technological coefficient β (=Y*/K), and 
of the available capital stock (K). 
  
(1) 𝑌 =
𝑌
𝑌∗
𝑌∗
𝐾
𝐾 = 𝑦𝛽𝐾                                                            
 
Given labor productivity (α) and the total labor force (N), equations (2) and (3) define 
the level of unemployment (U) and the unemployment rate (u), with (δ) as the ratio of 
potential output over the maximum amount of goods producible according to labor 
productivity and the available labor force10. 
 
(2) 𝑈 = 𝑁 − 𝐸 = 𝑁 − (𝑌 𝛼⁄ )  
 
(3) 𝑢 =
𝑁−(𝑌/𝛼)
𝑁
= 1 −
𝑌
𝑌∗
𝑌∗
𝛼𝑁
= 1 − 𝛿𝑦 
 
As far as the labor market is concerned, we assume workers and trade unions to target a 
desired real wage rate and therefore, given labor productivity, a desired wage share (1–τw) 
(‘τw’ being the profit share implicitly consistent with trade unions’ target). We assume the 
                                                        
9 Y* stands for potential output, i.e. the maximum amount of output the economy could produce by fully 
utilizing the available capital stock.  
10 In this model, we assume that possible bottlenecks taking place on the supply side of the economy take the 
form of shortage of productive capital rather than, strictly speaking, shortage of labor. Therefore, the 
economy will be always characterized by a certain, say, structural degree of unemployment.     
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bargaining power of trade unions to positively depend on the degree of regulation and 
protection of workers on the labor market, say the generosity of unemployment benefit ?̅? 
among other factors. Accordingly, we assume (1–τw) to be a positive function (and, 
correspondingly, τw a negative one) of the ‘labor market regulation variable’ (z). Equation 
(4) defines the nominal wage rate (w) bargained by trade unions on the basis of their 
targeted wage share and their price expectations (Pe): 
 
(4) 𝑤 = (1 − 𝜏𝑤(𝑧(?̅?))𝑃
𝑒𝛼 
 
Firms, on their side, target a desired profit rate (rd). Given their expectations about the 
level of capacity utilization (ye) – see more on this below, they set the mark-up (m) on 
variable costs and the ensuing profit share (τ) on domestic income consistently with their 
goals. Equations (5) and (6) formalize firms’ behavior and its implications in terms of the 
price setting-rule of the home-good price (PH): 
 
(5) 𝑟𝑑 = 𝜏(𝑚)𝑦𝑒 hence 𝑚 = 𝜏(𝑟𝑑 𝑦𝑒⁄ )−1 with (𝜕𝜏 𝜕𝑟𝑑⁄ ) > 0; (𝜕𝜏 𝜕𝑦𝑒⁄ ) < 0 
 
(6) 𝑃𝐻 = (1 +𝑚)𝑤/𝛼  
 
In our open economy, equations (5) and (6), together with foreign prices (PF) and the 
nominal exchange rate (e) concur to determine the real exchange rate (q), see equation (7) 
below: 
  
(7) 𝑞 =
𝑒𝑃𝐹
𝑃𝐻
=
𝑒𝑃𝐹
(1+𝑚)(1−𝜏𝑤)𝑃𝑒
 
 
Once described the production side of the economy, let analyze the components of 
aggregate demand. As to domestic consumption, let fist assume it is a positive function of 
working households’ disposable income. Disposable income in turns depends on the wage 
bill W (=wE), public transfers (TrG), and unemployment benefits (?̅?𝑈). Once paid taxes 
according to the taxation rate (t), a proportion (s) of disposable income is saved. 
Consumption expenditures are then allocated on domestic goods and imported ones 
according to the spending shares η(q) and (1-η) respectively, η being a positive function of 
the real exchange rate q. Equation (8) eventually defines consumption demand for home-
made goods normalized by the domestic capital stock: 
 
(8) 
𝐶
𝑃𝐻𝐾
= (1 − 𝑠)(1 − 𝑡)𝜂 [
𝛽
𝛼
(𝜔 − ?̅?)𝑦 +
𝛽
𝛼
?̅? + 𝜌] 
 
With 𝜔(= 𝑤 𝑃𝐻⁄ ) and ?̅? (= ?̅? 𝑃𝐻⁄ ) as the real wage rate and the real unemployment benefit 
(in terms of the price of the home-made good) – with 𝜔 > ?̅? , and 𝜌(= 𝑇𝑟𝐺 𝑃𝐻𝐾⁄ ). 
In line with the literature on expansionary austerity, we assume that, according to, say, 
a permanent income argument, households’ saving propensity (s) depends positively on 
the expected future tax rate te. Current cuts in public expenditures, if sufficiently strong 
and reliable, may induce households to increase current consumption since that they may 
expect a lower tax burden tomorrow. By the same token, we also assume households’ 
saving propensity to depend negatively on public transfers. Indeed, it is reasonable to 
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believe that a permanent cut in public transfers, perhaps due to the decision of downsizing 
the provisions of the welfare system (read a less generous domestic pension system), may 
also induce households to adopt a precautionary stance and save more today in 
anticipation of lower public transfers tomorrow 11 . Equation (9) below put the above 
considerations in formal terms: 
 
 (9) 𝑠 = 𝑓(𝑡𝑒 , 𝑇𝑟𝐺) with (𝜕𝑠/𝜕𝑡𝑒) > 0; (𝜕𝑠/𝜕𝑇𝑟𝐺) < 0 
 
Equation (10) gives public purchases, once again normalized for the existing capital 
stock K, as an exogenous policy variable γ. 
 
(10) 
𝐺
𝑃𝐻𝐾
= 𝛾   
 
Equation (11) defines the current growth rate of the capital stock. For the sake of 
simplicity, following Taylor (2012), we assume that investment demand is purely 
autonomous in the short run, so that it does not depend on current capacity utilization. 
Perhaps consistently with a Harrodian interpretation of Keynesian macroeconomics, and 
in order to captures the ‘expectation argument’ put forward by the EAT, we first imagine 
entrepreneurs to define the desired increased in the available capital stock according to 
their expectations about capacity utilization (ye)12. On the one hand, entrepreneurs will 
increase investments should they expect the economy to expand and capacity utilization to 
be high in the future. On the other hand, they will scale down investment projects if a 
vulnerable and unsound macroeconomic environment spreads negative expectations of a 
contacting economic activity. 
We also assume investment demand to be a negative function of the costs of external 
borrowing (iH). Once again, this assumption aims at grasping one of the pillars of the 
expansionary austerity building, i.e. the expansion in private investments possibly 
triggered off by austerity measures prompting a reduction in interest rates.  
 
(11) 
𝐼
𝐾
= 𝑔(𝑦𝑒 , 𝑖𝐻 ) 
 
With 𝑔𝑦𝑒 > 0 and 𝑔𝑖𝐻 < 0. 
 
Finally, in equation (12), we assume normalized exports to be a simple linear positive 
function of the real exchange rate q. 
 
(12) 
𝐸𝑋
𝑃𝐻𝐾
= 𝜖𝑞 
 
As to the ‘financial’ side of the economy, let first consider how private firms finance 
their desired investment expenditures. In this model, we assume that non-financial firms 
                                                        
11 The same logic may apply in presence of a reduction of public benefits to unemployed people that perhaps 
makes average expected income lower.  
12 See again the recent contribution by Alesina et al. (2015) on the crucial role entrepreneurs’ expectations, 
and hence investment, may play in giving rise to what they interpret as examples of (spending-based) 
expansionary fiscal consolidations. 
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retain all profits in order to fund capital accumulation. Additionally, they take loans from 
commercial banks (dL) for the part of investments not covered by internal funds. In the 
real life, it is obviously possible that commercial banks ration available credits so that not 
all investment projects are eventually financed. For the sake of simplicity, we do not take 
this eventuality explicitly into account. Yet, commercial banks fix the interest rate (iH) 
charged on loans to non-financial firms. In periods of financial distress, commercial banks 
very likely increase the mark-up rate through which they determine iH (see more on this 
below). By doing this, they increase the cost of external financing of non-financial firms’ 
investments, and implicitly cut the total amount of financed investment projects13. 
Commercial banks holds two types of assets on their balance sheet. On the one hand, 
they buy domestic government bonds. On the other hand, they concede loans to firms. 
Government bonds are considered as ‘relatively’ safe assets. Indeed, they constitute the 
collaterals commercial banks commercial banks commonly use in refinancing operations 
with the central bank even in periods of financial turbulences on the market for sovereign 
bonds. On the contrary, loans to firms are considered as ‘relatively’ riskier. Following 
Mehrling (2011), commercial banks may not be allowed to shift private sector’s loans on 
the balance sheet of the central bank or of other financial institutions. Once created, loans 
to the private sector will likely remain on their own balance sheet until maturity, together 
with the corresponding creditor risk. Accordingly, we assume commercial banks to set the 
interest rate (iH) on loans to the private sector by applying a mark-up (μ) on the interest 
rate (id) got on government bonds (see equation (13))14.  
 
(13) 𝑖𝐻 = (1 + 𝜇)𝑖𝑑 
 
Public deficit and, hence, new bonds’ issuances, are given by the difference between 
government’s outlays, i.e. public purchases, public transfers, unemployment benefits, and 
interest payments on the accumulated public debt stock (Ψ), and tax revenues. The 
following expression defines public deficit in nominal terms, whilst equation (14) 
normalizes it by the capital stock: 
 
 𝑑𝐷 = 𝐺 + 𝑇𝑟𝐺 + ?̅?𝑈 − 𝑡[𝑤𝐸 + 𝑇𝑟𝐺 + ?̅?𝑈] + 𝛹  
 
Hence: 
 
(14) 
𝑑𝐷
𝑃𝐻𝐾
= 𝛾 + (1 − 𝑡) (𝜌 + ?̅?
𝛽
𝛼
𝛿) − [𝑡𝜔 + (1 − 𝑡)?̅?]
𝛽
𝛼
𝑦 + 𝜓 = 𝜉 + 𝜓 
 
With (ξ) as the primary deficit-to-capital stock ratio, and (ψ) as the costs of debt servicing 
over the capital stock. 
Finally, equations (15) formalizes in the simplest way possible how the interest rate on 
government bonds is determined on the financial and credit market.  
 
                                                        
13 In our model, commercial banks do not ration financed project by changing the position of the effective 
demand for credit on the credit market, but by moving along the effect demand for credit by fixing a higher 
interest rate on available credit.  
14 Alternatively, one can also interpret such a mark-up rate (μ) as the natural spread dividing interest rates on 
riskier assets (i.e. private loans) from those charged on safer ones (i.e. government bonds). 
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(15) 𝑖𝑑 = 𝑖 + 𝜎(𝑏, 𝛺)  
 
With:  
 
𝜎 > 0 and (𝜕𝜎/𝜕𝑏) > 0 if Ω = 1; 
 
𝜎 = 0 and (𝜕𝜎/𝜕𝑏) = 0 if Ω = 0 
 
Given the supply of new bonds given by public sector financing needs, bids for bonds by 
domestic commercial banks and foreign investors depend on the perceived degree of 
soundness of public finances, and the level of safety of the corresponding financial 
liabilities. In turn, the riskiness of government bonds likely relies upon the ‘monetary 
framework’ in which government bonds are issued. Following De Grauwe (2011), 
monetarily sovereign countries issue bonds denominated in their own currency, which is in 
turn controlled by the corresponding central bank. Even more importantly, the central 
bank will likely intervene any time it likes on financial market and buy government bonds 
in order to prevent default risks to emerge. Accordingly, in monetarily sovereign countries, 
government bonds are usually considered as risk-free assets. Of course, this is not the case 
of Eurozone economies. Indeed, Eurozone governments issue bonds denominated in a 
foreign supranational currency outside their own (direct or indirect) control. On top of 
this, Eurozone rules impose national governments to find resources on private financial 
markets only, and forbid the ECB from buying public bonds (at least on the primary 
market). In a way, the solidity of Eurozone national finances is in the hands of financial 
operators’ will. Accordingly, financial operators perceive Eurozone governments’ bonds as 
potentially riskier assets. 
Consistently with these arguments, in equation (15) the interest rate on government 
bonds is established by financial markets’ behavior according to the UIP. In equation (15), 
(i) stands for the interest rate on risk-free assets. Parameter (σ) represents a specific 
country factor risk. It jointly depends on the state of public finances, and on country-
specific ‘monetary institutions’ arrangements’. In particular, we assume σ to depend 
positively on the public deficit-to-GDP ratio b=(ξ+ψ)/βy15. The higher is b, the higher will 
be the interest rate national governments will have to pay on issued public bonds. This 
relationship, however, holds true only in the case of non-monetarily sovereign economies, 
i.e. when the bivariate ‘institutional variable’ Ω is equal to 1. Following De Grauwe and Ji 
(2013), in the case of monetarily sovereign economies, i.e. when Ω=0, this relationship 
breaks down, and government bonds yields get insensitive to economic fundamentals such 
as the fiscal policy stance (read public deficit), the growth rate of the economy, and its net 
external investment position16. Accordingly, government bonds get the ‘status’ of risk-free 
assets, and the corresponding interest rate is exogenously set equal to (i). 
                                                        
15 In this model, we assume the interest rate id to be a (positive) function of public deficit-to-GDP ratio only, 
and not of the debt-to-GDP ratio. This is, of course, a simplifying assumption. Yet, whilst it makes 
mathematical passages more tractable, it does not change the meaning or the results of our analysis. This 
assumption will be relaxed in the long-run analysis performed in the second part of the paper.    
16 De Grauwe and Ji (2013) stress that “[in the case of “stand-alone” economies] financial markets do not 
seem to be concerned with the size of the government debt and of the fiscal space […] despite the fact that the 
variation of these ratios is of a similar order of magnitude as the one observed in the Eurozone (De Grauwe 
and Ji, 2013, p. 24)”.  
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2.2 The short-run macroeconomic effects of public transfers’ cuts 
The supporters of the expansionary austerity stress that well-designed fiscal 
consolidations must take the form of deep, persistent and credible cuts in public 
expenditures, in particular public transfers and public employees’ wages, perhaps followed 
by reductions in the tax burden on households. In their view, such a shift in fiscal policy 
may constitute a ‘regime change’ that can immediately foster economic activity through 
three main mechanisms. First, successful fiscal corrections can positively affect the 
behavior of private economic actors, both households and firms, through the so-called 
‘expectation channel’. Upfront public spending cuts, it is argued, may induce economic 
agents to elaborate optimistic expectations by anticipating future tax reductions and 
consequent increases in their own (permanent) income. This, in turn, may incentivize 
them to immediately raise consumption and to unleash new investments, giving 
momentum to current economic activity. Second, tough fiscal corrections that prove to be 
effective in reducing public deficit and public debt stock can stimulate investments and 
growth by re-establishing bond vigilantes’ trust in public finances’ solvency and prompting 
a significant reduction in interest rates. Finally, cuts in public wages can foster exports by 
establishing a climate of wage moderation on the labor market, hence engineering an 
internal and external devaluation. 
In our theoretical framework, equation (16) defines the level of capacity utilization y 
that ensures the equilibrium in the goods market: 
 
(16) 𝑦 =
(1−𝑠)(1−𝑡)𝜂(𝑞)(?̅?
𝛽
𝛼
+𝜌)+𝛾+𝑔(𝑦𝑒,𝑖𝐻)+𝜖𝑞
[𝛽−(1−𝑠)(1−𝑡)𝜂
𝛽
𝛼
(𝜔−?̅?)]
        
 
More than that, equation (16) represents the crucial economic relation through which we 
can theoretically inquire the effectiveness of well-designed austerity packages to prompt 
economic recovery in the short-run.  
In order to perform such analysis, let first assume the government to implement a 
restrictive fiscal adjustment such that the cyclically adjusted primary deficit over GDP 
decreases by an amount equal to – θ. Also assume that fiscal consolidation mainly consists 
in cuts to public transfers (i.e. dTrG < 0). In terms of our model, once defined the CAPB-to-
GDP ratio as 𝑏∗ =
1
𝛽
[𝛾 + (1 − 𝑡) (𝜌 + ?̅?
𝛽
𝛼
𝛿) − [𝑡𝜔 + (1 − 𝑡)?̅?]
𝛽
𝛼
], we get: 
   
(17) 𝑑𝑏∗ = −𝜃 =
(1−𝑡)
𝛽
𝑑𝜌 =
(1−𝑡)
𝛽𝑃𝐻𝐾
𝑑𝑇𝑟𝐺, so that: 𝑑𝑇𝑟𝐺 = −
𝑌∗
(1−𝑡)
𝜃 
 
With θ > 0. 
 
In our model, such a fiscal adjustment has a direct and simultaneous short-run effect on 
both current capacity utilization y and b. Totally differentiating y and b, and taking into 
account the sign of equation (17), we get a system of two simultaneous equations for dy 
and db:    
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(S.1) 
{
 
 
 
 𝑑𝑦 =
−[𝑓𝑡𝑒(1−𝑡)𝜂(?̅?
𝛽
𝛼
+𝜌)𝑑𝑡𝑒−𝑓
𝑇𝑟𝐺
𝜂(?̅?
𝛽
𝛼
+𝜌)𝑌∗𝜃]−(1−𝑠)𝜂𝑌∗𝜃−𝑔𝑖𝐻
(1+𝜇)𝜎𝑏𝑑𝑏
[𝛽−(1−𝑠)(1−𝑡)𝜂
𝛽
𝛼
(𝜔−?̅?)]
𝑑𝑏 = −
𝑌∗
𝛽𝑦
𝜃 − [𝑡𝜔 + (1 − 𝑡)?̅? + 𝑏]
𝑑𝑦
𝑦
 
 
With 𝑓𝑡𝑒 > 0; 𝑓𝑇𝑟𝐺 < 0; (𝜎𝑏|Ω) ≥ 0; 𝑑𝑡
𝑒 < 0 
 
Equations (18) and (19) give the solutions dyS and dbS of system (S.1):  
 
(18) 𝑑𝑦𝑆 =
[𝑓𝑡𝑒(1−𝑡)𝜂(?̅?
𝛽
𝛼
+𝜌)]|𝑑𝑡𝑒|
⏞                  
+ 𝑜𝑟 0
−[(1−𝑠)−𝑓
𝑇𝑟𝐺
(?̅?
𝛽
𝛼
+𝜌)]𝜂𝑌∗𝜃
⏞                    
−
+𝑔𝑖𝐻
(1+𝜇)
𝑌∗
𝛽𝑦
𝜎𝑏𝜃
⏞            
+ 𝑜𝑟 0
{[𝛽−(1−𝑠)(1−𝑡)𝜂
𝛽
𝛼
(𝜔−?̅?)]−𝑔𝑖𝐻
(1+𝜇)𝜎𝑏[
𝑡𝜔+(1−𝑡)?̅?+𝑏
𝑦
]}
 
 
 
(19) 𝑑𝑏𝑆 = −
𝑌∗𝜃
𝛽𝑦
− [𝑡𝜔 + (1 − 𝑡)?̅? + 𝑏]
𝑑𝑦𝑆
𝑦
 
 
What emerges from equations (18) and (19) is that there is not any clear outcome of fiscal 
austerity. Indeed, the sign of equation (18) may be positive, confirming the expansionary 
austerity hypothesis, or negative, in line with the traditional Keynesian concern about the 
recessionary effects of fiscal retrenchments. The same applies to equation (19). Public 
transfers’ cuts might help reducing public deficit over GDP or, alternatively, they may be 
counterproductive and lead to an even higher deficit-to-GDP ratio in the event they would 
trigger a tough economic contraction. In the end, the introduction in our model of 
expansionary austerity-like assumptions, and the detailed formalization of what is 
considered a well-designed austerity package, does not guarantee at all austerity measures 
to be effective.   
Despite such indeterminacy, some worrisome points are worth stressing. First, the 
expansionary outcome of fiscal adjustments heavily depends on the intensity of partial 
derivative 𝑓𝑡𝑒, and of |𝑑𝑡
𝑒|, i.e. the expected reduction in the tax rate levied on households. 
The higher and the quicker is |𝑑𝑡𝑒|, the more rapidly and robustly private consumption 
may respond positively to public budget’s cuts. Interestingly, and perhaps paradoxically, it 
is reasonable to think that such positive expectations will hardly materialize in an economy 
characterized by a high public debt stock, i.e. the economic scenario in which, according to 
EAT supporters, fiscal consolidation is primarily needed. Indeed, when public debt D is 
considerably high and a prolonged period of fiscal consolidation is foreseen, a high degree 
of uncertainty may ‘surround’ the extent and the timing of future tax cuts (at least with 
respect to current certain spending cuts). In such a context, the ‘expectation channel’ is 
extremely weak at best, and likely more than compensated by the overwhelming 
contractionary effect of current public transfers’ cuts. 
Second, public transfers’ cuts, expansionary austerity proponents say, can boost growth 
by reducing public deficit, hence interest rate id on public bonds and, above all, interest 
rate iH on banks’ loans to the private sector. Such a reduction in the cost of external 
borrowing may in fact spur private investment, and induce the economy to expand. 
According to our model, however, such an effect of fiscal adjustments on interest rates 
does not take place in monetarily sovereign economies. Following equations (13) and (15), 
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in the case of monetarily sovereign countries, the ‘financial market channel’ seems to be 
irrelevant (i.e. σb=0), and the allegedly expansionary impact of fiscal consolidation turns 
out to be even more questionable.  
The ‘financial market channel’ might be at work in the case of eurozone countries that 
issue public bonds denominated in a supranational currency, and in which the solidity of 
public finances hinge upon financial markets’ sentiments. In such a context, one could be 
persuaded that front-loaded fiscal adjustments might reassure financial markets about the 
sustainability of eurozone countries’ fiscal positions, and thus create a favorable economic 
environment for growth. This logic may hold true if fiscal adjustments effectively put fiscal 
variables under control. Yet, we are very far from taking such an outcome of fiscal 
consolidation as guaranteed. Indeed, recent empirical evidence shows that it is hard to find 
a way out from public balance disarrays without sustained growth (Ali Abbas et al., 2013), 
and that fiscal multipliers may be high and positive when economies are in the midst of a 
recession (Batini et al., 2012; Baum et al., 2012; Qazizada and Stockhammer, 2015). If so, 
severe and perhaps premature fiscal retrenchments may actually induce a short-run 
deterioration in fiscal variables by jeopardizing growth (see Ali Abbas et al., 2013).  
More formally, let assume an economy in which (a) the ‘credibility channel’ is strong, 
and financial operators overreact to changes in public deficits (i.e. σb >> 0); (b) 
improvements in public balance are over-dependent on changes in economic activity (i.e. 
((𝑡𝜔 + (1 − 𝑡)?̅? + 𝑏)/y >> 0). In such a scenario, the denominator of equation (18) likely 
turns out to be negative. Despite discretionary budget cuts could per se reduce public 
deficits, even a small contraction in economic activity eventually makes public disarrays 
deeper instead of smaller. Financial operators get even more frightened by worsening 
public finance conditions, and interest rates skyrocket. Economic recession gets deeper 
and gives rise to an endless ‘race to the bottom’ (see Figure 1), which will inevitably end up 
in a public debt default, and in a tremendously painful crisis. This kind of dynamics may 
sadly resemble that one observed in Greece since 2010. The message to policy-makers is: 
in the context of non-monetarily sovereign countries, in which the ‘financial channel’ is 
judged to be relevant to stabilize real and financial variables, it is of paramount importance 
to assess the effectiveness of austerity packages to prompt quick recoveries before 
implementing them. If even a mild recession is like to come, austerity measures may give 
rise to a financial disaster rather than consolidating public finances.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Finally, since mid-2012, financial speculation on peripheral Eurozone countries’ bonds 
has calmed down thanks to the well-known Mario Draghi’s ‘whatever it takes’ pledge. 
Interest rates id have decreased significantly. They are currently at historically minimum 
levels. In such a context, it makes sense to question the effectiveness of the ‘financial 
channel’. As Roberto Perotti himself stresses, “if fiscal consolidations were expansionary in 
the past because they caused a steep decline in interest rates or inflation, it is unlikely that 
the same mechanism can be relied on in the present circumstances, with low inflation and 
interest rates close to zero (Perotti, 2012, p.309)”.       
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2.2 The short-run macroeconomic effects of lower unemployment benefits 
An additional proposition of the EAT is that fiscal adjustments should also aim at 
reforming the labor market, directly or indirectly. For instance, cuts in unemployment 
benefits ?̅?  may induce wage moderation. This, in turn, may improve the external 
competitiveness of the economy and boost growth via rising exports and lower imports. In 
our model, system (S.2) captures the short-run effects of such additional fiscal austerity 
measure: 
  
(S.2)
{
 
 
 
 
𝑑𝑦 =
(1−𝑠)(1−𝑡)𝜂(𝛽/𝛼)[(1−𝑦)?̅?+𝜔𝑦𝜀𝑤,?̅?](𝑑?̅?/?̅?)
⏞                                
−
+(𝜂𝑞Γ+ϵ)(𝜕𝑞/𝜕𝑤)(𝜕𝑤/𝜕?̅?)𝑑?̅?⏞                    
+
−𝑔𝑖𝐻
(1+𝜇)𝜎𝑏
⏞        
+
𝑑𝑏
[𝛽−(1−𝑠)(1−𝑡)𝜂
𝛽
𝛼
(𝜔−?̅?)]
𝑑𝑏 =
𝛽
𝛼
[(1 − 𝑡)(𝛿 − 𝑦)?̅? + 𝑡𝑦𝜔𝜀𝑤,?̅?]
𝑑?̅?
?̅?
− [𝑡𝜔 + (1 − 𝑡)?̅? + 𝑏]
𝑑𝑦
𝑦
 
 
With Γ = (1 − 𝑠)(1 − 𝑡) {
𝛽
𝛼
[?̅? + (𝜔 − ?̅?)𝑦] + 𝜌}; (𝜕𝑤/𝜕?̅?) > 0 and 𝜀𝑤,?̅?  as the elasticity of 
nominal wages w to the unemployment subsidy ?̅?; (𝜕𝑞/𝜕𝑤) < 0; 𝑑?̅? < 0.  
Equations (20) and (21) give the solutions of system (S.2):  
 
(20) 𝑑𝑦𝑆2 =
{(1−𝑠)(1−𝑡)𝜂(𝛽/𝛼)[(1−𝑦)?̅?+𝜔𝑦𝜀𝑤,?̅?]+(𝜂𝑞Γ+ϵ)(𝜕𝑞/𝜕𝑤)(𝜕𝑤/𝜕?̅?)𝑑?̅?−𝑔𝑖𝐻
(1+𝜇)𝜎𝑏(𝛽/𝛼)[(1−𝑡)(𝛿−𝑦)?̅?+𝑡𝑦𝜔𝜀𝑤,?̅?]}
⏞                                                                                    
?
𝑑
?̅?
𝑤
{[𝛽−(1−𝑠)(1−𝑡)𝜂
𝛽
𝛼
(𝜔−?̅?)]−𝑔𝑖𝐻
(1+𝜇)𝜎𝑏[𝑡𝜔+(1−𝑡)?̅?+𝑏]/𝑦}
 
 
 
(21) 𝑑𝑏𝑆2 =
𝛽
𝛼
[(1 − 𝑡)(𝛿 − 𝑦)?̅? + 𝑡𝑦𝜔𝜀𝑤,?̅?]
𝑑?̅?
?̅?
− [𝑡𝜔 + (1 − 𝑡)?̅? + 𝑏]𝑑𝑦𝑆2 
 
Once again, it is evident than no clear-cut solutions exist, and that the theoretical basis 
of the EA doctrine is extremely weak. In particular, when the direct and indirect effects 
(i.e. the decrease in monetary wages w) of cuts in unemployment benefits are taken into 
account, the immediate outcome of such measures is a lower demand injection (i.e. lower 
consumption). This would certainly deepen a recession instead of prompting recovery. Of 
course, the contraction in domestic consumption might well be compensated by rising 
exports (and lower imports) as boosted (discouraged) by a lower domestic nominal wages 
w, and thus, ceteris paribus, by a depreciated real exchange rate q. However, increasing 
net exports and, possibly, booming economic activity, strongly rely upon the sensitiveness 
of net exports to the real exchange rate (i.e. parameters 𝜖 and ηq in equation (20)), which 
in turn is conditional to the sectorial composition of net exports themselves and to the 
degree of openness of the economy (see Taylor, 1991). It is perhaps not by chance that one 
of the most cited examples of successful expansionary austerity is that one taking place in 
Ireland in late 1980s. Ireland is now a small open economy that is highly integrated on 
international goods markets, and that exports a restricted but highly dynamic variety of 
manufactured products. At the end of the 1980s, Irish exports were already accounting for 
more than 50 percent of Irish GDP. A fundamental pillar of the late 1980s Irish economic 
rebound was the solid expansion of Irish exports also due to a significant initial one-shot 
devaluation of the Irish pound (Perotti, 2012). At least in the case of Eurozone countries, 
such a policy recipe is not available any longer. On top of this, it is questionable whether a 
relatively closed and largely de-industrialized small country like Greece could currently 
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follow a similar recovery strategy. There are good reasons to believe that EAT-sponsored 
internal devaluation in Greece would give rise to opposite results with respects those wage 
moderation supposedly generated in Ireland when it was combined with other no-more 
available policy options, and when it was implemented in a much more favorable domestic 
and international economic scenario. 
 
3.  The long-run dynamics 
 
Even admitting that austerity measures may imply some costs in the short-run, the 
supporters of expansionary austerity nevertheless claim that well-designed fiscal 
consolidations can pave the way for much higher benefits in the medium-to-long run. 
These benefits are supposed to emerge form the allegedly safer macroeconomic 
environment austerity could lead to by putting public finances under control. 
In order to critically enquire such proposition, let analyze the dynamics of some relevant 
economic variables. Take price dynamics first. On the basis of equations (5) - (6), let 
assume for the sake of simplicity that workers ground their price expectations on domestic 
prices only, so that Pe=(PH)e. Even further, let assume that both the targeted real wage by 
trade unions, and the desired profit rate by non-financial firms are exogenous and do not 
change through time. Consistently with these assumptions, trade unions modify their 
(nominal) wage claims should any gap be registered, ex-post, between expected prices and 
effective ones (i.e. should their targeted wage share be inconsistent with that one 
eventually determined by the price-setting decisions of non-financial firms) 17 . More 
formally (with ‘hat variables’ representing percentage variations): 
 
(22) ?̂? =
𝑃𝐻−𝑃𝑒
𝑃𝑒
= [(1 + 𝑚(𝑟𝑑 𝑦𝑒)(1 − 𝜏𝑤) − 1⁄ ] 
 
Non-financial firms may decide to change their mark-up if their expectations about 
capacity utilization, and hence their targeted profit rate, are not fulfilled. In particular, we 
could write: 
 
(23) (1 + ?̂?) = 𝜏?̂? = 𝜏𝜗(𝜏𝑦𝑒 − 𝜏𝑦) = 𝜏2𝜗(𝑦𝑒 − 𝑦) 
 
In equation (23), ϑ stands for the extent by which non-financial firms adjust their mark-up 
rate (m) as a consequence of unrealized expectations. Non-financial firms may increase 
their mark-up rate (m) in the attempt to raise profitability from unsatisfactory low levels as 
due to an effective capacity utilization lower than the expected one (i.e. ye>y). 
Alternatively, firms may be satisfied of a perhaps slightly lower mark-up rate should 
economic activity be buoyant and competitive pressures increasing 18 . Equation (24) 
defines domestic price inflation by combining equations (22) and (23): 
 
                                                        
17 It is easy to verify that the condition PH=(PH)e  implies (1 +𝑚)(1 − 𝜏𝑤) = 1, hence (1 − 𝜏𝑤) =
1
1+𝑚
= (1 −
𝜏), where (1 − 𝜏) is workers’ wage share effectively emerging in the economy once firms have set prices 
according to their expectations and desired profit rate.  
18 See Taylor (2004, ch.3) for a review of the literature assuming the mark-up rate to be a negative function of 
capacity utilization. 
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(24) 𝑃?̂? = 𝜏2𝜗(𝑦𝑒 − 𝑦) + [(1 +𝑚(𝑟𝑑 𝑦𝑒)(1 − 𝜏𝑤) − 1⁄ ]      
 
In the EA theoretical building, the formation and the evolution of expectations play a 
crucial role for austerity packages to be expansionary. In the EAT, expectations’ formation 
follows a standard forward-looking perfect foresight logic as elaborated by fully rational 
economic actors. Such a theoretical apparatus significantly downgrades the degree of 
uncertainty affecting economic actors’ decisions. It excludes by assumption the systemic 
risks, and the occurrence of long-lasting periods of economic depression/stagnation 
possibly triggered off by financial crises and public debt defaults. 
The theoretical infrastructure just described seems quite unrealistic and incapable to 
represent the worldwide economic scenario emerging in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 
financial meltdown. For sure, it is unsuitable to describe the climate of economic and 
political havoc characterizing the Eurozone since the beginning of 2010. In the last five 
years, economic decisions in the Eurozone have been taken in a condition of deep 
substantive and procedural uncertainty (Dosi and Egidi, 1991). First, economic actors did 
not dispose of clear information about the real solidity of member states’ public finances, 
and about the extraordinary policy measures recurrently announced to restore fiscal 
soundness. Second, they did not know how to elaborate such information in light of the 
spreading pessimism about eurozone survival. Given the ensuing climate of radical 
uncertainty, the best economic actors could (can) do was to elaborate expectations in a 
myopic fashion. This is formally stated in equation (25), which models how non-financial 
firms’ expectations evolve: 
 
(25) 𝑦?̂? = 𝜙(𝑦 − 𝑦𝑒) = 𝜙(𝑦(𝑦𝑒 , 𝜆) − 𝑦𝑒) 
 
Non-financial firms revise upward their expected level of capacity utilization, and hence 
set 𝑦?̂? > 0, when current capacity utilization (y) turns out to be higher than the expected 
one. On the contrary, should effective capacity utilization fall smaller than expected, 
expectations will be updated downward.  
Two different stability scenarios may characterize expectations’ dynamics. On the one 
hand, a self-stabilizing adjustment process prevails if current economic activity, via desired 
investments, does not overreact to changes in expectations. Mathematically, this scenario 
takes place if (𝜕𝑦?̂? 𝜕𝑦𝑒⁄ ) < 0), i.e. if the following condition 
𝑔𝑦𝑒
[𝛽−(1−𝑠)(1−𝑡)𝜂
𝛽
𝛼
(𝜔−?̅?)]
< 1 is fulfilled. 
On the other hand, should 
𝑔𝑦𝑒
[𝛽−(1−𝑠)(1−𝑡)𝜂
𝛽
𝛼
(𝜔−?̅?)]
 be greater than 1, and (𝜕𝑦?̂? 𝜕𝑦𝑒⁄ ) > 0 , 
exuberant (over-depressed) investment decisions will respond to improving (worsening) 
expectations. In this event, the revision of expectation would be characterized by an 
unstable knife-edge Harrodian dynamics. 
With respect to the short-run model described above, in equation (25) we introduction 
an additional EAT-like assumption. Following the arguments put forward by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010), we assume that, on top of a higher deficit-to-GDP ratio, an increasing debt-
to-GDP ratio λ=D/PHY can also have a negative impact on economic activity. In the specific 
case of non-monetarily sovereign countries, in particular, a higher and supposedly riskier 
public debt stock may negatively impact on commercial banks’ balance sheets due to 
decreasing prices of sovereign bonds. This may in turn lead commercial banks to search for 
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higher ‘safety’ margins on fundable projects and revise upward the mark-up rate μ. Ceteris 
paribus, commercial banks will charge higher interest rates iH on loans to the private 
sector. Widespread turbulences on the market for sovereign bonds may materialize 
together with a private banks’ crisis and a credit crunch on the market for private sectors’ 
loans. Eventually, all these tightly entangled events may entail harsh effects on economic 
activity, and possibly drive the economy in a recession. 
The debt-to-GDP ratio is commonly considered as a variable of paramount importance 
to assess the long-run sustainability of public finances. Equation (26) describes the 
dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio λ. After some mathematical passages, we get: 
 
(26) (
𝐷
𝑃𝐻𝑌
̂
) = ?̂? =
𝑑𝐷
𝐷
− 𝑃?̂? − ?̂? =
(𝜉+𝜓) 𝛽𝑦⁄
𝜆
− 𝑃?̂? − ?̂? − ?̂?= 
 
     ?̂? =
𝜉(𝑦(𝑦𝑒)/𝛽𝑦(𝑦𝑒)
𝜆
+
𝜓(𝜆)/𝛽𝑦(𝑦𝑒)
𝜆
− {𝜀𝑦,𝑦𝑒𝑦?̂? + 𝜀𝑦,𝑖𝐻𝑖?̂?(𝜆) − (1 − 𝜀𝑦,𝑞)𝑃
?̂?(𝑦𝑒) − 𝑔(𝑦𝑒 , 𝑖𝐻)}  
 
In equation (26), 𝜀𝑦,𝑦𝑒 = (𝑔𝑦𝑒𝑦
𝑒 𝑦(𝑦𝑒 , 𝑖𝐻)⁄ ) is the elasticity of current capacity utilization y 
to the expected one ye, whilst 𝜀𝑦,𝑖𝐻 = 𝑔𝑖𝐻𝑖ℎ 𝑦(𝑦
𝑒 , 𝑖𝐻)⁄  is y’s elasticity to the interest rate iH. 
Finally, 𝜀𝑦,𝑞 is y’s elasticity to the real exchange rate. For the sake of simplicity, in equation 
(26), we assume that both the nominal exchange rate (e) and foreign prices (PF) do not 
change. Accordingly, the dynamics of the real exchange rate (q) boils down to the 
percentage variation in the price of the domestic good. 
As to the stability properties of the debt-to-GDP ratio, it is first of all reasonable to think 
that higher firms’ expectations ye, and hence higher current economic activity y and 
investment flows ?̂?, contribute to reduce and stabilize λ. 
The effects that λ may display on its own dynamics are trickier. Following Botta (2013), 
at relatively low levels of the debt-to-GDP ratio, a slightly higher value of the state variable 
λ makes any additional public deficit less relevant in percentage terms. Accordingly, in 
equation (26) ?̂? turns out to be smaller and the debt-to-GDP ratio under control. However, 
at much higher values of the debt stock, some of the concerns of the supporters of the EAT 
may materialize. On the one hand, the higher is λ, the higher will be the burden of debt 
payments over GDP ψ 19 . On the other hand, 𝑖?̂?  may respond positively to high and 
increasing debt-to-GDP ratios, due to the abovementioned intertwined dynamics between 
λ and the interest rate on loans to the private sector. In the end, when financial operators 
start to fear, rationally or not, that λ has reached excessively high levels, destabilizing 
forces may set in passing by increasingly cumbersome repayment commitments, and the 
perverse effects supposedly unsafe public finances may induce on interest rates and 
economic activity20. 
                                                        
19 This effect comes both as a natural consequence of a higher debt stock, as well as a consequence of 
financial operators’ assessments of the financial risks characterizing highly indebted economies. Again, in 
particular in the case of non-monetarily sovereign countries, the accumulation of an increasing public debt 
stock can easily induce financial operators to raise the country factor risk σ, ask for higher interest rates id, 
and eventually make repayment conditions more stringent.    
20 In the analysis of equation (26), we have assumed that price dynamics and the evolution of the real 
exchange mutually compensate each other (i.e. εy,q = 1). On the one hand, higher inflation reduces the real 
burden of the public debt stock. On the other hand, it may raise λ by appreciating q, jeopardizing net exports, 
and eventually inducing a contractionary effect on current economic activity. For the sake of simplicity, we 
neglect to explicitly consider the direct and indirect effects 𝑃?̂?may play on (?̂?). 
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Equations (25) and (26) jointly define an evolving economic system, in which a variety 
of different trajectories may emerge and define the joint dynamics of fiscal variables and 
economic activity. Figures 2 and 3 graphically describe (part of) such dynamics in the (ye-
λ) space. According to the analysis developed above, the locus for a constant debt-to-GDP 
ratio (?̂?=0) may take the form of a U-shaped curve. In this sense, λT stands for the dividing 
threshold of the debt-to-GDP ratio, above which financial operators believe destabilizing 
forces will mount. From a graphical point of view, it represents the turning point after 
which the upward sloping arm of the locus for (?̂?=0) emerges. In Figure 2, we describe the 
case of self-stabilizing forces to prevail in ‘shaping’ expectations’ dynamics. Hence, the 
locus for (𝑦?̂? = 0) slopes downward. In Figure 3, we portray the case for self-induced 
instability characterizing expectations’ dynamics. Accordingly, the locus for (𝑦?̂? = 0)  is 
positively sloped. In Figures 2 and 3, the vertical dashed line ‘λmax’ stands for the ceiling 
value of the debt-to-GDP ratio financial operators would accept to finance before rejecting 
additional treasury bond issuances and giving rise to public bankruptcy. Similarly, the 
horizontal dashed line represents the technology-bounded (highest) level expected and 
effective capacity utilization can reach.  
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
Under certain parametric conditions, the system we describe is much far away from 
displaying the unique and stable equilibrium that usually characterizes EAT-like 
mainstream models populated by fully rational perfect-foresighted agents (see Bertola and 
Drazen, 1990; Barry and Devereux, 2003). In our model, path-dependence, cumulative 
mechanisms and multiple equilibria dominate the scene21. In Figure 2, for instance, point 
A represents a locally stable equilibrium featuring a relatively high level of capacity 
utilization and a low debt-to-GDP ratio. Nevertheless, point B is a ‘perverse’ unstable 
equilibrium, which combines low capacity utilization with a burdensome debt stock. On 
the right-hand side of point B, worrisome cumulative mechanisms get momentum. They 
can move the economy towards point C. In point C, financial markets eventually repudiate 
sovereign bonds, and public debt default takes place. The economic activity collapses.  
Such destabilizing forces are even stronger in Figure 3. In this case, despite of a 
relatively low debt-to-GDP level, even point A shows saddle-path instability. In the 
absence of perfect-foresighted and optimizing agents, any even small deviation from point 
A triggers off diverging dynamics. In an optimistic scenario, a booming economic activity 
could go hand-in-hand with a monotonically decreasing debt stock. However, the economy 
may alternatively enter a far more worrisome path, along which collapsing expectations 
and economic activity mutually feedback with an exploding and eventually defaulting debt 
burden. 
 
 
                                                        
21 The condition for multiple equilibria to exist requires |(𝜕?̂?/𝜕𝜆) (𝜕?̂?/𝜕𝑦𝑒)⁄ |
?̂?=0
| > |(𝜕𝜙/𝜕𝜆) (𝜕𝜙/𝜕𝑦𝑒)⁄ |𝜙=0| when 
λ tends towards zero. This condition is likely to fulfil if we reasonably assume that the EAT-like negative 
effect the debt-to-GDP ratio λ may carry out on effective capacity utilization, and hence on the dynamics of 
expectations, is close to zero and negligible at low levels of the debt-to-GDP ratio itself.   
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3.1 Short-run costs with long-run benefits? The intrinsic long-run inconsistency of EAT 
Given the above scenarios, may well-designed austerity packages be a bitter medicine 
against fiscal indiscipline in the short run, but revitalizing the economy in the long run? 
Let assume that the government implements a drastic and permanent cut in public 
transfers and/or social service provisions (i.e. ρ and ?̂? decrease in equation (16)). As some 
recent contributions in the EAT vein themselves admit, let assume these measures curtail 
economic activity in the short-run. If so, in Figure 4 such a contractionary fiscal policy 
shock shifts the isocline for (?̂? = 0) upward. At the same time, the isocline for (𝑦?̂? = 0) 
moves downward. In Figure 4, it turns out to be clear that the long-run consequences of an 
austerity-led short-term recession are radically at odds with the EAT prospected 
achievements. Should the economy be initially located in equilibrium point A, it will 
eventually end up in equilibrium A2, featuring both a depressed expected and effective 
economic activity (at least with respect to that associated to the initial equilibrium), and an 
increased debt burden. Even more worrisome, should the economy be located in 
equilibrium B, an endless crisis and a mounting unsustainable debt stock will eventually 
bring the economy towards an inevitable default (point B2 in Figure 4). 
Such undesirable long-run outcomes of short-term austerity-led contractions would 
arise even more easily in the radically unstable macroeconomic environment described in 
Figure 3. In such a scenario, long-run instability would emerge even with an economy 
originally located in the apparently safe low-debt equilibrium A. Due to economic actors’ 
expectations overreacting to fiscal policy shocks, even a slight upward shift in the isoclines 
for constant values of λ and ye (see Figure 5) will eventually induce a permanent 
contraction in economic activity and an unsustainable public debt-to-GDP ratio to emerge. 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
[Figure 5 here] 
 
More in general, the economy we describe, or at least some relevant economic variables, 
may display explosive cumulative dynamics. This is the case of the debt-to-GDP ratio when 
government bonds are issued by non-monetarily sovereign countries, public debt 
sustainability is in the hands of financial market operators, and λ eventually exceeds the 
stability thresholds financial operators have adopted as shared but fragile convention. 
These non-linear, possibly cumulative dynamics are source of path-dependence and 
multiple trajectories. A common aspect of these trajectories is that short-run austerity-led 
costs cause even stronger pains rather than benefits in the long run. In the context of 
overreacting expectations and/or highly indebted economies, they risk to make the 
macroeconomy more vulnerable and unstable, rather than safer and more solid. This is 
why “a radical solution for high debt is [may be] to do nothing at all— [and] just live with it 
(Ostry and Gosh, 2015)”, at least when we come to consider tough fiscal retrenchments as 
an option to tackle with it. Other way around, short-run costs and long-run benefits of 
austerity measures are mutually inconsistent. Even in a theoretical framework that takes 
on board some crucial EAT assumptions, austerity must be expansionary in the short run 
in order to pay off in the long run. Unfortunately, we have seen at length how the former 
events, i.e. short-run austerity-led expansions, are very unlikely to happen, and to pave the 
way for the latter. 
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3.2 The case for endogenous monetary institutions 
In our model, country-specific institutions contribute to determine the short- and long-run 
outcome of fiscal shocks. More in details, the specific rules guiding central bank flexibility 
in purchasing government bonds and taking action against financial distress crucially 
modify how austerity may affect economic activity, the public deficit, and the public debt.  
In the short run, the degree of monetary sovereignty of an economy contributes to 
define which channel is active, through which fiscal consolidation might deliver 
expansionary outcomes.  In monetarily sovereign countries, the central bank can easily buy 
government bonds in order to backstop any extraordinary fiscal effort against economic 
and financial crises. This is why it is common belief that “Sovereigns do not default 
(Kregel, 2012, p.3)”. This is also why bonds issued by monetarily sovereign countries are 
perceived as risk-free assets, and safe shelter where financial operators store funds in 
times mounting uncertainty. According to these facts, the ‘financial channel’ through 
which austerity might hypothetically boost growth is not at work in monetarily sovereign 
economies. Such channel may be operative in non-monetarily sovereign eurozone member 
states. However, its effectiveness is contingent to the highly debatable capacity of austerity 
measures to prompt expansions and squeeze public deficits (and debts) from the very 
onset. 
The degree of monetary sovereignty can fundamentally alter the long-run stability of the 
economy. In monetarily sovereign countries, the domestic central bank can promptly 
neutralize the negative effects that an increasing debt-to-GDP ratio may display on 
financial and credit markets. In terms of our model, this implies eliminating, or at least 
taming, the explosive consequences that a too high debt stock may induce on its own 
dynamics (via ψ and 𝑖?̂?) once it has overcome the stability threshold λT. Graphically (see 
Figure 2), this amounts to remove the upward sloping part of the locus for (?̂? = 0), or at 
least make it emerge at a far higher value of the debt-to-GDP ratio, and with a much flatter 
slope. In sum, full monetary sovereignty can significantly expand the safe area (say the 
stability zone surrounding point A in Figure 2) financial operators may bear in mind, and 
impede destabilizing circles to originate. By the same token, the lack of monetary 
sovereignty constitutes a fundamental source of financial fragility, as the Eurozone 
experience in the immediate aftermath of the worldwide financial crisis sadly witnesses. 
In this model, we presented such an institutional dichotomy as exogenously given, and 
captured by the binary time-invariant parameter Ω. Nonetheless, the events taking place in 
the Eurozone since 2012 demonstrate that institutions, monetary institutions among them, 
can also co-evolve through time together with ‘pure’ economic variables. The 2007-2008 
financial crisis initially emerged as an external shock to euro countries. Due to the peculiar 
features or, better, the shortcomings of the eurozone institutional building, a private debt 
crisis evolved into an even worse sovereign debt crisis. The inability of the euro system to 
deal with this problem, and actually the increasing risk of a eurozone suicide, eventually 
induced the ECB to pursue a gradual, partial, yet important drift towards an embryonic 
(and path-dependent) form of monetary sovereignty22. In the end, the ‘whatever it takes’ 
                                                        
22 Path-dependency here emerges from the perhaps unusual and original institutional arrangements the euro 
system adopted in 2012 in order to definitively snap off financial turbulences, given the existing (legal and 
political) constraints to the goals the ECB should pursue, the actions it could takes, and the lack of a 
eurozone centralised fiscal authority.   
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statement by Mario Draghi, and the launch of the OMT program, may constitute good 
examples of endogenous structural (say institutional) changes (Lordon, 1997) inspired by 
the intrinsic dynamics of the system, and by the very same economic issues they aim to 
tackle with. 
The effects of such a change are well known. Previous hikes in the interest rates of 
sovereign bonds issued by peripheral eurozone countries have literally disappeared. Since 
mid 2012, interest rates on public debt have constantly decreased, now reaching 
historically minimum levels. Financial operators have stopped to obsessively scrutinize the 
solidity of public finances of peripheral countries. In terms of our model, Figure 6 portrays 
the stabilizing forces sparked in the Eurozone by the so-called ‘Draghi put’.  
 
[Figure 6 here] 
 
Let assume that the worldwide ‘Great Recession’ and the rescue packages of domestic 
financial institutions cause public deficits and public debts to suddenly rise. Let also 
assume that debt-to-GDP ratios overcome the stability threshold λT, which financial 
operators fix at relatively low levels in the specific case of (non-monetarily sovereign) 
eurozone countries. In the absence of any significant change, financial turbulences would 
mount and peripheral eurozone countries find themselves stuck on the verge of bankruptcy 
(as effectively happened). The extraordinary measures taken by the ECB board at the 
height of the crisis represent the endogenous response of the system to such apparently 
inevitable end. In Figure 6, the upward-sloping arm of the locus for (?̂? = 0)  moves 
downward and changes slopes. The isocline for constant values of the debt-to-GDP ratio λ 
gets transformed in a prevalently downward-sloping locus. Point B shifts to point B1; the 
destabilizing forces on the right of point B are inverted into stabilizing ones (see newly 
emerging red arrows). The economies that were desperately reining against a seemingly 
unavoidable default, can now rejoin stability, and (perhaps gradually) converge back to 
point A.           
 
4. Conclusions 
 
An increasing body of literature admits that front-loaded fiscal retrenchments can likely 
cause an economic recession and an increasing debt-to-GDP ratio (Gros, 2012; Ali Abbas 
et al.,2013; Warmedinger et al., 2015) in the short run. The short-run version of our 
models shows this concern to be well grounded. Nonetheless, the above literature 
describes recession and rising debt-to-GDP ratios as the necessary costs to support in the 
short run in order to reap much higher benefits in the long run. In this paper, we show how 
this proposition is theoretically inconsistent. In order to pay off in the long run, austerity 
must be expansionary and debt reducing from the very onset. Unfortunately, economists 
and policy-makers alike are increasingly skeptical this event will ever materialize. 
In light of these findings, the right policy recipe against the sovereign debt crisis, and 
the right timing to implement it, look like radically different from what effectively done so 
far in the Eurozone. In the case of highly indebted non-monetarily sovereign economies 
like Greece, in the absence of any radical institutional change, macroeconomic stability 
and growth can be primarily achieved through a significant debt relief. Alternatively, 
monetary institutions should immediately adopt the decisive step-in the ECB too late 
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announced in July 2012. This would give to national governments more space of maneuver 
to gradually and less painfully reform their economies in a much more stable environment. 
Only subsequently some mild austerity measures could be considered in those (few) 
countries effectively dealing with some problems of fiscal profligacy. 
Following Eichengreen and Panizza (2014), too ambitious and prolonged adjustment 
programs are hardly implementable. They also fail to recognize that significant reductions 
in the debt burden have historically occurred during periods of high growth, rather than in 
periods of recession or anemic growth. If growth is the main way out of the crisis, and one 
does not want to openly consider expansionary fiscal policies, attention should at least 
focus on public support to industrial, innovation, and investment policies. Public 
investment banks, the European Investment Bank in the case of the eurozone, if not 
governments directly, may turn out to be decisive actors to eventually prompt a sustained 
and sustainable recovery.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 – Austerity-led ‘endless’ economic contraction and explosive deficit-to-GDP in an 
unstable short-run setting. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Multiple equilibria in the (ye-λ) space with self-stabilizing expectations
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Figure 3 – Multiple equilibria in the (ye- λ) space with unstable expectations 
 
 
Figure 4 – Long-run outcomes of austerity-led short-run recessions in a stable dynamic 
scenario 
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Figure 5 – Long-run outcomes of austerity-led short-run recession in an unstable dynamic 
scenario 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 – Stabilizing macroeconomic effects of monetary sovereignty 
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